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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STEVEN M. STILLING,

:

Petitioner/Appellee,

:

v.

:

UTAH BOARD OF PARDONS AND
PAROLE; 0. LANE McCOTTER,
Executive Director, Utah
Department of Corrections;
and the STATE OF UTAH,

:

Respondents/Appellants.

Case No. 950818-CA

Priority No. 3

:

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (Supp. 1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1.

The district court erred in determining that the Utah

Board of Pardons and Parole (the Board) lacks statutory authority
to order restitution as a condition of parole.
STANDARD OF REVIEW:

The district courtfs interpretation of

a statute presents a question of law that is reviewed for
correctness, according no particular deference to the district
court's decision.
(Utah App. 1995) .

State v. Strader. 902 P.2d 638, 640

2.

The district court erred in determining that the Board's

assessment of restitution as a condition of Stilling's parole
violated the Utah Constitution's prohibition against ex post
facto laws.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The district court's conclusion that the
Board violated Stilling's rights under the Utah Constitution is a
question of law which this Court reviews for correctness.

State

v. Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 855 (Utah 1992).
3.

The district court erred in determining that allowing

the Board to assess restitution as a condition of parole exceeds
the authority granted it by article VII, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.
STANDARD OP REVIEW: The district court's constitutional
interpretation involves a question of law which this Court
reviews for correctness.

State v. Contrel. 886 P.2d 107, 111

(Utah App. 1994), cert, denied. 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES
The text of all constitutional provisions and statutes
pertinent to resolution of the issues before this Court is
contained in Addendum B of this brief.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Petitioner Steven M. Stilling filed a petition for

extraordinary relief against the respondents on July 6, 1994,
alleging that the Board violated his rights under the Utah
Constitution by ordering restitution as a condition of his parole
where no restitution had been ordered by the trial court at the
time he was sentenced for the underlying offenses.
B.

R. at 1-10.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW
Stilling moved for summary judgment on July 19, 1995,

asserting that by ordering him to make restitution as a condition
of parole, the Board (1) exceeded the authority granted it by
article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution, and
(2) violated the Utah Constitution's ban against ex post facto
laws.

R. at 67-76.

on October 12, 1995.

The district court granted Stilling's motion
(A copy of the district court's order is

attached hereto as Addendum A.)

The district court expressly

held that (1) Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 (1995), which
address the Board's authority to order restitution, do not allow
the Board to order restitution in cases such as this, and (2)
application of these sections, which were not effective at the
time Stilling was sentenced on the underlying offenses, violates
3

the Utah Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws.
R. at 126-135.

The district court additionally suggested that

permitting the Board to order restitution in the present case
would exceed the authority granted under article VII, section 12
of the Utah Constitution by allowing the Board "to don the robe
of the judiciary and decide the amount of restitution owed as a
result of the underlying criminal act when restitution was not
ordered in the original sentencing proceeding."
C.

R. at 129.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On February 13, 1985, Steven M. Stilling was sentenced for

three aggravated robbery offenses; no restitution was ordered by
the district court at the time of sentencing.

R. at 22-24.

Following hearings on August 13 and 24, 1993, the Board granted
Stilling a parole date of May 24, 1994. At that time, the Board
further determined that a restitution hearing should be held to
determine the amount of restitution, if any, that Stilling must
pay as a condition of his parole.

R. at 54-56.

On April 28,

1994, the Board held a restitution hearing at which Stilling was
present.

The hearing officer determined that restitution was

proper and ordered restitution as a condition of Stilling's
parole.
1994.

R. at 57. Stilling was subsequently paroled on May 24,

R. at 36, 69.
4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The district court improperly granted summary judgment in
favor of petitioner Stilling.

First, the district court erred in

determining the Board lacks statutory authority to order
restitution as a condition of parole.

Second, the district court

erred in determining that the Board's assessment of restitution
as a condition of Stilling's parole violated the Utah
Constitution's prohibition against ex post facto laws.

Third,

the district court erred in determining that allowing the Board
to assess restitution as a condition of parole exceeds the
authority granted it by article VII, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution.

Accordingly, the district court's order granting

summary judgment in favor of Stilling should be reversed.
ARgUMENT
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT THE BOARD LACKS STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO
ORDER RESTITUTION AS A CONDITION OF PAROLE
The district court interpreted Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-27-5 and
77-27-6 (1995), which address the Board's authority to order
restitution, as prohibiting the Board from assessing restitution
as a condition of parole where no restitution had been ordered by
the trial court at the time of sentencing.

Specifically, the

district court held that the Board is authorized to order
5

restitution in only two limited contexts, (1) when restitution
was imposed by the trial court as part of the underlying sentence
and (2) when the State, the Department of Corrections, or any
other State agency incur costs "that arise due to the
petitioner's needs or conduct."

However, the district court's

interpretation of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 clearly
contradicts the plain language of those sections.
It is well settled that a statute should be construed
according to its plain language.

Vtflh Sign, IftCt v, Ut9h Pep't

of Transp.. 896 P.2d 632, 633 (Utah 1995).

Thus, when statutory

language is plain and unambiguous, appellate courts do not look
beyond it to surmise the legislature's intent.
Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989).

Brinkerhoff v.

Moreover, "unambiguous

language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its
plain meaning.'' Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989)
(per curiam).
At the time of Stilling's parole hearings, section 77-27-5
stated:
(1)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall
determine by majority decision when and under what
conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of
the state, persons committed to serve sentences in
. . . all felony cases except treason or impeachment or
as otherwise limited by law, may be released upon
parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their
6

fines, forfeitures, or restitution remitted, or their
sentences commuted or terminated.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5 (1995).

Thus, the plain language of

this section provides that subject to the limitations prescribed
by chapter 27 and by other state laws, the Board has complete
authority to order restitution.
One such limitation is contained in section 77-27-5(1) (c),
which states in part, uNo restitution may be ordered . . . except
after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed
examiner in open session."

Id.

However, this limitation was met

in the present case, a fact that Stilling does not contest.
Another limitation is found in section 77-27-5(5), which
provides:
In determining when, where, and under what
conditions offenders serving sentences may be paroled,
pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have their fines
or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall
consider whether the persons have made or are prepared
to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a
condition of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or
forfeitures, or commutation or termination of sentence.
Id.

Under this section, the Board is simply required to consider

whether restitution has already been ordered and made in
accordance with a trial court's sentencing order before assessing
restitution as a condition of parole.
7

Thus, inasmuch as the

trial court did not order restitution at the time of sentencing
in the present case, the limitations found in section 77-27-5(5)
are not relevant here.
A further clarification of the Board's authority to order
restitution was subsequently added in section 77-27-5(1)(e),
which states:

"The board shall determine restitution in an

amount that does not exceed complete restitution if determined by
the court in accordance with Section 76-3-201." Utah Code Ann.
§ 77-27-5(1) (e) (Supp. 1995).

The plain language of this section

limits the amount of restitution that the Board may assess in
cases in which the trial court has already determined the proper
amount of restitution.

Again, this section is not applicable to

the instant case because no restitution had been previously
ordered at the time of sentencing, and therefore, the Board is
not limited by section 77-27-5(1)(e) to a specific restitution
amount previously determined by a court.

In fact, section

77-27-5(1) (e) implicitly supports the Board's authority to assess
restitution in cases in which restitution has not been ordered by
the trial court at the time of sentencing.

By stating that the

Board is limited in the amount of restitution amount it may
assess in instances where restitution has been ordered by the
trial court at the time of sentencing, section 77-27-5(1) (e)
8

necessarily implies that there are other instances in which the
Board is not likewise limited in the amount of restitution it may
order.

Because Judge Lewis's reading of the statute would

effectively render this portion meaningless and void, such
interpretation cannot stand.

See Nelson v. Salt Lake County. 905

P.2d 872, 876 (Utah 1995); gtQgord FerrO v, Vtfrh Pep't of
Commerce. 828 P.2d 507, 513 (Utah App. 1992).
Like section 77-27-5, section 77-27-6 also provides support
for the Board's authority to order restitution.

That section

states, in pertinent part:
When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the
release of an inmate who has been sentenced to make

restitution pursuant tP Section 75-3-2Q1 sn whom the
board has ordered to make restitution, and all or a
portion of restitution is still owing, the board may
establish a schedule including both complete and courtordered restitution, by which payment of the
restitution shall be made, or order community or other
service in lieu of or in combination with restitution.
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-6(1) (1995) (emphasis added).

Clearly,

the use of the disjunctive, "or," contemplates that the Board
may, by its own authority, order restitution.
Moreover, even if the district court correctly read the
language of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 as expressly authorizing
the Board to order restitution in the two specific instances laid
out in subsections 77-27-6(2) and -6(3), there is nothing in
9

those sections, or elsewhere in state law, that limits the Board
to assessing restitution only in such cases. Because the Board's
authority is not thereby limited, the Board's action is proper,
even if not expressly authorized, under its general authority to
"determine by majority decision when and under what conditions
. . . persons committed to serve sentences in . . . all felony
cases . . . may be released upon parole."

Utah Code Ann.

§ 77-27-5(1) (a) (1995) .
In any event, the district court's interpretation of
sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 as prohibiting the Board from
ordering restitution in this case is clearly contrary to the
plain language contained therein and is, therefore, incorrect as
a matter of law.
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT THE BOARD'S ASSESSMENT OF RESTITUTION AS
A CONDITION OF STILLING'S PAROLE VIOLATED THE
UTAH CONSTITUTION'S PROHIBITION AGAINST
EX POST FACTO LAWS
As an alternative ground for its ruling, the district court
held that the Board's assessment of restitution against Stilling
in the instant case violated the Utah Constitution's prohibition
against ex post facto laws.

Except for stylistic changes, the

above versions of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 became effective
on April 1, 1985.

Pursuant to the authority granted by those
10

sections, restitution was ordered by the Board as a condition of
Stilling's parole in April 1994. However, the district court
held that since Stilling was originally sentenced for the three
underlying aggravated robbery offenses in February 1985,
application of sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 to him would increase
his punishment and therefore such application would be ex post
facto.

Respondents respectfully disagree.

Article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution states:
"No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the
obligation of contracts shall be passed."

u

An ex post facto law

is one that, inter alia, 'makes more burdensome the punishment
for a crime, after its commission."'

State v. Burgess. 870 P.2d

276, 278 n.3 (Utah App. 1994) (quoting State v. Norton. 675
P.2d 577, 585 (Utah 1983), cert, denied. 466 U.S. 942 (1984),
overruled on other grounds by St3te Vt Hunger}; 734 P.2d 421 (Utah
1986)) .
However, in the instant case, assessment of restitution
under section 77-27-5 as a condition of parole does not increase
Stillingfs punishment.

As always, his sentence is three

one-to-fifteen year terms, and Stilling had the option to reject
the conditions of parole and serve out the remainder of his
sentence.

Mansell v. Turner. 14 Utah 2d 352, 353, 384 P.2d 394,
11

395 (Utah 1963).

The imposition of restitution as a condition of

parole is simply that, a condition to Stilling being permitted
the privilege of parole.

Thus, no violation of the ex post facto

provision of the Utah Constitution has occurred.

See Burgess,

870 P.2d at 278 n.3; Norton. 675 P.2d at 586.
Other states have reached a similar conclusion.

In White v.

People. 866 P.2d 1371 (Colo. 1994) (en banc), the Colorado
Supreme Court held that requiring parolee to participate in a sex
offender treatment program that did not exist when parolee was
originally sentenced did not constitute additional punishment,
but merely the denial of the privilege of parole.

Consequently,

such a requirement did not violate ex post facto clause.
1374.

Id. at

Similarly, in Msllinger v, Iflfrhp Pep't pf CprreCtJPRg, 757

P.2d 1213 (Idaho App. 1988), the Idaho Court of Appeals held that
conditions of parole are not additional punishments for the crime
for which parolee was incarcerated, but simply grounds for losing
parole.

Id. at 1218.

Furthermore, it is well settled that parole proceedings are
not criminal proceedings.

Thus, the Utah Supreme Court has

stated that double jeopardy guarantees are not violated "when a
defendant is convicted of criminal charges and those same face
are used as grounds for revoking the defendant's parole."
12

Johns v. Shulsen. 717 P.2d 1336, 1337 (Utah 1986) (citing State
v. Bullock. 589 P.2d 777 (Utah 1979)); egqprd Hatch v. Deland.
790 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah App. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by
Labrum v. Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993).

Similarly,

since parole proceedings are not criminal in nature, the
imposition of restitution as a condition of parole following such
a hearing cannot be viewed as the imposition of a second
punishment for the underlying crime.
"A statutory amendment does not violate the ex post facto
clause merely because it works to the detriment of the accused."
Norton. 675 P.2d at 585 (citing Beazell v. Ohio. 269 U.S. 167,
170 (1925)).

It must also affect an accrued right of the

accused.

Id. at 586.

In this case, Stilling's sentence has not

changed.

The change at issue here is simply a change in the law

regarding conditions of parole.

Since no expectation of certain

conditions of parole accrued to Stilling until the time of his
parole hearing, well after sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 were
passed, application of those sections to him cannot be said to be
applied ex post facto.
Moreover, Andrews v. Utah Board of Pardons. 836 P.2d 790,
793 (Utah 1992), upon which the district court relied in support
of its conclusion that application of sections 77-27-5 and
13

77-27-6 to Stilling is ex post facto, is readily distinguishable.
In Andrews. the Utah Supreme Court, in the context of deciding
whether to grant Andrews' petition for a commutation hearing,
held that application of substantive standards that had been
passed subsequent to the time at which the crime was committed
would diminish Andrews' opportunity for commutation in violation
of article I, section 18 of the Utah Constitution.

Id. at 793.

However, in the present case, the Board had plenary authority to
order restitution both at the time that Stilling committed the
underlying offenses and at the time of his parole hearing.

Thus,

Andrews is not controlling here.
At the time the underlying offenses were committed, the case
law clearly supported the Board's plenary authority, absent an
abuse of discretion, to place conditions including restitution on
parole.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court, "The plenary

authority of the Board of Pardons should not be disturbed in the
absence of a clear abuse of its rightful discretion."
Smith. 573 P.2d 781, 782 (1978).x

Ward v.

See also Utah Code Ann.

Stilling claims that the Board lost its plenary power after
article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution was amended in
1980 to give the legislature authorization to enact standards
governing when persons convicted of various crimes are eligible
for parole. However, that amendment did not eliminate the
Board's plenary power. In fact, in State v. Kent, 665 P.2d 1317
14

§ 77-27-1 (1982) (defining parole as release from imprisonment on
conditions prescribed by the Board which the parolee must
satisfactorily perform in order to be entitled to a termination
of sentence).

In fact, even banishment has been upheld as a

valid condition of parole.
384 P.2d 394 (1963).

Mansell v. Turner. 14 Utah 2d 352,

The breadth of the Board's plenary powers

was plainly set forth in section 77-27-3, which stated that
u

[t]he board of pardons shall determine, by majority decision,

when and under what conditions, subject to the provisions of this
chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all cases
except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law,
may be released upon parole."
(1982).

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-3(1)

That section additionally provided that

xx

[t]he

determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever . . . shall

(Utah 1983), a post-amendment case, the Utah Supreme Court
expressly reaffirmed the position it took in Ward, stating:
"Parole is a conditional release, the condition being
that the prisoner make good or be returned to serve his
unexpired time. It is a privilege, an act of grace, as
distinguished from a right. Parole is not absolute liberty
as all law-abiding citizens enjoy, but only conditional
liberty dependent upon compliance with parole restrictions.
The parolee remains in legal custody until such time as his
sentence is terminated."
Kent. 665 P.2d at 1319 (quoting Ward. 573 P.2d at 782) (footnotes
omitted).
15

be final."

Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-3(2) (1982).

Thus, even prior

to the express authority to order restitution found in sections
77-27-5 and 77-27-6, the Board had the implicit authority to
order restitution under its plenary powers.
Similarly, after sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 were amended,
the Board continued to have the authority to order restitution.
"Decisions of the Board of Pardons in cases involving paroles,
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution,
or remission of fines or forfeitures are final and are not
subject to judicial review.'' Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-5(3) (1995)
(emphasis added).

Accordingly, application of sections 77-27-5

and 77-27-6 to Stilling is not ex post facto because the
enactment of those sections did not diminish Stilling's rights.
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING
THAT ALLOWING THE BOARD TO ASSESS RESTITUTION
AS A CONDITION OF PAROLE EXCEEDS THE
AUTHORITY GRANTED IT BY ARTICLE VII, SECTION
12 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION
In rendering its decision in this matter, the district court
did not directly address Stilling's claim that permitting the
Board to order restitution in the present case would exceed the
authority granted the Board under article VII, section 12 of the
Utah Constitution.

However, the court did suggest that result

when it stated that it would be improper to allow the Board
16

"to don the robe of the judiciary and decide the amount of
restitution owed as a result of the underlying criminal act when
restitution was not ordered in the original sentencing
proceeding."

Therefore, it is necessary for respondents to

address petitioner's article VII, section 12 claim.
When faced with a constitutional challenge to a statute,
"the act is presumed valid, and we resolve any reasonable doubts
in favor of constitutionality,"

Society of Separationists, Inc.

v. Whitehead. 870 P.2d 916, 920 (Utah 1993).

"Additionally,

while we must give effect to constitutional mandates, we must
also attempt to reconcile the challenged statute with the
constitution, particularly if the constitutional mandate is
subject to more than one reasonable interpretation."

State v.

Robertson. 886 P.2d 85, 87 (Utah App. 1994) (citing Timpanogos
planning fr W^ter Management Agenqy v, Central Utah Water
Conservancy Dist.. 690 P.2d 562, 564 (Utah 1984)), cert, granted.
899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 1995).

In other words, this Court will

"afford the statute every presumption of validity, so long as
there is a reasonable basis upon which both provisions of the
statute and the mandate of the constitution may be reconciled."
Timpanogos. 690 P.2d at 564.
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Article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution provides in
pertinent part:2
(2)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by
majority vote and upon other conditions as provided by
statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and
restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant
pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason
and impeachments, subject to regulations provided by
statute.
Utah Const, art. VII, § 12 (Supp. 1995).
Stilling claims that since this section does not specify
that the Board may order restitution, the Board is therefore
forbidden from doing so.

However, this is not necessarily so.

As the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated in

2

Prior to its 1992 amendment, article VII, section 12 stated
in relevant part:
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor,
Justices of the Supreme Court and Attorney General
shall constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of
whom, including the Governor, upon such conditions as
may be established by the Legislature, may remit fines
and forfeitures, commute punishments, and grant pardons
after convictions, in all cases except treason and
impeachment, subject to such regulations as may be
provided by law, relative to the manner of applying for
pardons; but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted,
and no commutation or pardon granted, except after a
full hearing before the Board, in open session, after
previous notice of the time and place of such hearing
has been given.
Utah Const., art. VII, § 12 (1991). However, since the 1992
amendment did not substantively change this section, respondents
will refer to this section in its current format.
18

United States v. Mesa-Rincon. 911 F.2d 1433 (10th Cir. 1990):
"'The motto of the Prussian state--that everything which is not
permitted is forbidden--is not a helpful guide to statutory
interpretation."'

Id. at 1437 n.3 (quoting United States v.

Torresi 751 F.2d 875, 880 (7th cir. 1984)); accorfl Natural gflg
Pipeline Co. v, Energy gathering, Inc T , 2 F.3d 1397, 1407 (5th
Cir. 1993), cert, denied. --- U.S. ---, 114 S. Ct. 882 (1994);
gee al?P State v. Hutchinson. 624 P.2d 1116, 1121-1126 (Utah
1980) (holding that local governments have independent authority
apart from, and in addition to, specific legislative grants of
authority, to engage in activities reasonably related to the
exercise of the powers granted them).

The same can be said of

constitutional interpretation in the present case:

Simply

because the Utah Constitution does not specify that the Board may
order restitution does not indicate that the Board is
constitutionally prohibited from doing so.
To the contrary, it is well settled that an agency of the
executive branch which has been granted powers under the Utah
Constitution is not strictly limited solely to the enumerated
powers set forth in the constitution.

For instance, Howell v.

County Bd. ex rel. IHC Hospitals. Inc.. 881 P.2d 880 (Utah 1994),
the Utah Supreme Court held that in order to carry out its
19

constitutional mandate, the Utah State Tax Commission necessarily
had authority in addition to the powers expressly given it in the
constitution.

Id. at 889-90.

Specifically, the court determined

that the tax commission had the authority to promulgate a set of
uniform standards governing charitable exemptions.

Id. at 889.

Moreover, it reached this conclusion despite the fact that this
authority is not expressly granted the tax commission in the
constitution.

Similarly, in the present case, despite the fact

that article VII, section 12, does not expressly state that the
Board of Pardons may order restitution, it does not forbid it,
and must be read in conjunction sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 to
allow it.
This is especially so here in light of the general enabling
language of article VII, section 12 that "[t]he Board of Pardons
. . . may grant parole . . . subject to regulations provided by
statute."

Thus, the Legislature did not circumvent the Utah

Constitution by enacting sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6, but merely
provided more definition to the Board's constitutionally-mandated
power to grant parole.

Likewise, in the instant case, the Board

simply exercised its constitutional power to grant parole subject
to the regulations provided in sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6. As
such, the Board did not exceed its constitutional authority.
20

Finally, as the Utah Supreme Court has previously
recognized:

"For all intents and purposes, adoption of this

indeterminate sentencing system transformed the Board from an
agency having the ability to shorten a prisonerfs
judge-determined sentence into an agency with power analogous to
that of a court to actually impose a sentence."
886 P.2d 1097, 1101 (Utah 1994).

Neel v. Holden.

Thus, given Utah's

indeterminate sentencing scheme, allowing the Board to M o n the
robes of the judiciary" in these circumstances is not only
permitted, but proper.

See Labrum v. Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d

902, 908 (Utah 1993); FPPtS Vt Utfrh PA- Of Pflycfon?, 808 P.2d 734,
735 (Utah 1991).
CONCLUSION
On the basis of the foregoing, the district court's order
granting summary judgment in favor of petitioner Steven M.
Stilling should be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this d\

day of February, 1996.
JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

-NORMAN E. PLATE
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for Appellants
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ADDENDUM "A"

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Steven M. Stilling,
Petitioner,

:

MEMORANDUM DECISION

:

Case Number 940904258
Judge Leslie Lewis

vs.

Utah Board of Pardons and Parole;
O. Lane McCotter, Executive
Director, Utah Department of
Corrections; and the State of Utah,
Respondents.

:
:
:

This case is before the Court on Mr. Stilling's motion for summary judgment. Mr.
Stilling was sentenced on February 13, 1985. On May 24, 1994, the Utah Board of Pardons
and Parole ("Board") granted Mr. Stilling a parole date conditioned upon his payment of
restitution. The Board's order dated June 2, 1995 is difficult to read, but it appears to list the
restitution owed as "$6613.57 (on #CR 83-176); $17,305.00 (on #16269, #16272 and #16271),
and $92.00 (on Extradition case #90-1900390)." The petitioner contends that the Board is not
authorized to order him to pay the $17,305.00 identified with case numbers 16269, 16272 and
16271 since he was not ordered to pay restitution in the underlying sentence.1

!

This claim is set forth in the Petition for Extraordinary Relief on page 4, paragraph 15. The Respondent
incorrectly asserts in its Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment that the Petitioner
complains about a case in which the judge has ordered restitution.
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MEMO DECISION

The Board's position is that Utah Code §77-27-5, authorizes it to order restitution even
if there is no court order of restitution. That statute was passed February 26, 1985 and was
effective April, 1985. The petitioner's position is that application of §77-27-5 and §77-27-6 to
him, violates the ban against ex post facto laws since he was sentenced on February 13, 1985,
a few months before the statutes' effective date,2 and application of this law increases the
punishment imposed. The State's response to this argument is that application of the law is not
ex post facto since the statute was effective on the date that petitioner was paroled, and the order
of restitution does not increase the punishment but is a mere condition of parole. Alternatively,
the State opines that the Board had plenary power to order restitution on the date that petitioner
was sentenced.
After a careful study of Utah Code §77-27-5 and §77-27-6, the Court finds that the Board
is authorized to impose restitution in two limited contexts. First, the Board may impose or
enforce any court order for restitution, under Utah Code §77-27-6(2). Second, the Board may
order restitution for costs that arise due to the petitioner's needs or conduct and incurred by the
Department of Corrections or the state or any other agency. Utah Code §77-27-6(3). However,
the Board is not authorized by this statute to order restitution for pecuniary loss related to the
underlying offense when restitution was not a part of the sentencing court's order.

2

Actually, the defendant's position is that the 1986 amendments to §77-27-5 and §77-27-6 do not apply to him.
However, the statutes were actually effective in 1985, with minor amendments being made in 1986. However, this
confusion on the part of the defendant does not change the fact that the statute was effective after he was sentenced.
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Utah Code §77-27-5 describes the Board's authority. The pertinent sections are set out
below:
77-27-5 Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority decision when and
under what conditions, subject to this chapter and other laws of the state, persons
committed to serve sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional
facilities which are under the jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony
cases except treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures, or restitution
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated.
(l)(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not exceed complete
restitution3 if determined by the court in accordance with Section 76-3-201.
77-27-6 Payment of restitution.
(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the release on parole of an inmate who
has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to Section 76-3-201 or whom the board
has ordered to make restitution, and all or a portion of restitution is still owing, the board
may establish a schedule, including both complete and court-ordered restitution, by which
payment of the restitution shall be made, or order community or other service in lieu of
or in combination with restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled
offender's performance, the board may consider the factors specified in Subsection 76-3201(4).
(2) The board may impose any court order for restitution and order that a defendant make
restitution in an amount not to exceed the pecuniary damages to the victim of the offense
of which the defendant has been convicted, the victim of any other criminal conduct
admitted to by the defendant to the sentencing court, or for conduct for which the
defendant has agreed to make restitution as a part of a plea agreement, unless the board
applying the criteria as set forth in Subsection 76-3-201(4) determines that restitution is
inappropriate.
(3) The board may also make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all costs
incurred by the Department of Corrections or the state or any other agency arising our
of the defendant's needs or conduct.
[emphasis added]
The general authority of the Board to order restitution is granted in Section 77-27-5;
however, that authority is limited by the language, "subject to this chapter and other laws of the

"Complete restitution means the restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by the
defendant." Utah Code §76-3-201(4)(cXi).
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State" emphasized above. Limits on the Board's authority to order restitution are described in
Section 77-27-5(l)(e) and in Section 77-27-6, First, the Board may only order an amount of
restitution that does not exceed the sentencing court's determination of the amount necessary to
compensate the victim for all losses caused by the defendant, if the court considered and
determined complete restitution was required. The implication of this language is that if the
sentencing court did not order complete restitution, the Board may not stand in the place of the
court and make a judicial determination of restitution.
The Board's authority to order restitution is further delineated in Section 77-27-6, entitled
"Payment of restitution/ That statute clearly states that the Board may impose any court order
for restitution, or the Board may make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all costs
arising out of the defendant's needs or conduct and incurred by the Department of Corrections,
the state, or any other agency. Those are the only two situations in which the Board is
authorized to order restitution. The statute does not authorize the Board to don the robe of the
judiciary and decide the amount of restitution owed as a result of the underlying criminal act
when restitution was not ordered in the original sentencing proceeding.4

The Court disagrees with the petitioner's statement that "in enacting Utah Code Ann. §§77-27-5 and 6 (Rep.
Vol. 8B 1995), the legislature attempted to grant judicial power to the Board because those provisions specifically
reference the statutory standard [i.e. §77-3-201] to be employed by sentencing judges as the standards to govern
the Board as well" (Petitioner's Memorandum In Support Of Petitioner's Motion For Summary Judgment, p.3.)
A careful reading of the statute reveals that it directs the Board to use the criteria of §77-3-201 when fixing the
schedule and supervising the offender's repayment performances (§77-27-6(1)) or in making a determination that
restitution is inappropriate (§77-27-6(2)). Although the statute is poorly drafted and confusing, the legislature has
not granted the Board power to sua sponte sentence an offender to pay restitution for pecuniary damages of the
underlying crime when restitution was not a part of the court's order.
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Further support for the Court's position is found in Utah Code §76-3-201(4). This section
directs the court to order restitution where appropriate, and sets out very specific criteria and
procedures that the court is to follow. If the court determines that restitution is appropriate, the
court must set out specific reasons for its decision as a part of the court record, and if the
defendant objects to the imposition, amount or distribution of restitution, the court shall allow
the defendant a full hearing on that issue at the time of sentencing. Clearly, an order of the
Board of Pardons and Parole to pay restitution for the pecuniary costs of the underlying crime
deprives the defendant of his rights to a fiill hearing before a neutral tribunal.
Assuming arguendo that the legislature empowered the Board to order restitution for an
underlying offense when restitution was not a part of the original sentence, the Court finds, as
an additional basis for this decision and as a matter of law, that the application of Sections 7727-5 and 77-27-6 to this petitioner is retroactive and increases the punishment and burden on the
petitioner. Thus, application of Sections 77-27-5 and 77-27-6 is barred.
The Utah supreme court spoke to the issue of retroactivity in Andrews v. Utah Bd. of
Pardons, 836 P.2d 790 (Utah 1992). In that case, the court held that amendments to the
statutory scheme governing the procedures of the Board (§77-27-5.5) cannot be applied to
inmates who committed their crimes prior to the enactment of the new statute if the statute is
detrimental to the inmate. Id. at 793. Application of such amendments would violate Article I,
Section 18 of the Utah Constitution's ban on ex post facto laws as well as Article I, Section 10
of the United States Constitution. Id.
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Likewise, in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990), the Utah Supreme Court used
a traditional statutory analysis when considering the retroactive application of a statute. Smith
was sentenced under a statute which was later amended so that the length of probation was
shortened. The court rejected Smith's argument that the later amendment should apply to his
case. The court explained that as a general rule, a statute is applied only prospectively.
However, if a statute is considered procedural or remedial then the statute may be applied
retroactively. A statute is "considered procedural or remedial, as opposed to substantive, if the
statute does not enlarge, eliminate, or destroy vested rights. " Id. at 792. Because this statute
enlarged the rights of a person placed on probation, it was substantive, and therefore could not
be applied retroactively. The court also noted that it has consistently held, "the law in force at
the time of sentencing governfs] and ... that an amendment to [a] statute passed after sentence
has no effect on the matter." Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 792 (Utah 1990).
The Smith court's analysis tracks that of the United States Supreme Court in Dobbert v.
Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 292, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 2298,53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977), wherein the court
held that an ex post facto statute is one that 'punishes as a crime an act previously committed,
which was innocent when done; which makes more burdensome the punishment for the crime,
after its commission, or which deprives one charged with crime of any defense available
according to law at the time when the act was committed.* (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S.
167, 169-170, 46 S.Ct. 68, 70 L.Ed. 216 (1925)).
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Applying the law to the facts in this case, the Court finds that the petitioner was
sentenced on February 13,1985, two months before the effective date of Utah Code 77-27-5 and
Utah Code §77-27-6. Therefore, under either the Smith or Andrews rule, the Court finds that
application of the statutes to the petitioner in 1993 was retroactive.
The second prong of the test outlined in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) is
whether the change in the law was substantive or procedural. In other words, will the change
in the law increase the burden of punishment for the crime? Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 2290,
2298 (1977). And more specifically, whether the application of Utah Code §77-27-5 through
an order of restitution increases the punishment ordered at sentencing.
In Matter ofAppeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action, 677 P.2d 943, 944 (Ariz. App. 1984),
the court addressed this issue and held that a statutory amendment which authorized the a
juvenile court to order restitution operated as an ex post facto law when applied to acts which
occurred before the act's effective date. To determine whether an act is ex post facto, the court
must analyze whether the statute has been applied retroactively, and whether the application
works a disadvantage to the offender. Id. at 945. The court stated that "not only was the
sanction for the unlawful activity increased to permit the imposition of a fine and restitution
where they were not permissible at the time appellant committed the act, but the conditions of
release on parole were modified to make payment of court ordered monetary reimbursement or
assessments a condition of release. This is the type of legal disadvantage which was disapproved
in Weaver* Id. at946.
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Applying the law to the facts in this case, the Court finds that the petitioner was
sentenced on February 13,1985, two months before the effective date of Utah Code 77-27-5 and
Utah Code §77-27-6. Therefore, under either the Smith or Andrews rule, the Court finds that
application of the statutes to the petitioner in 1993 was retroactive.
The second prong of the test outlined in Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788 (Utah 1990) is
whether the change in the law was substantive or procedural. In other words, will the change
in the law increase the burden of punishment for the crime? Dobbert v. Florida, 97 S.Ct. 2290,
2298 (1977). And more specifically, whether the application of Utah Code §77-27-5 through
an order of restitution increases the punishment ordered at sentencing.
In Matter of Appeal in Maricopa Cty. Juv. Action, 677 P.2d 943,944 (Ariz.App. 1984),
the court addressed this issue and held that a statutory amendment which authorized the a
juvenile court to order restitution operated as an ex post facto law when applied to acts which
occurred before the act's effective date. To determine whether an act is ex post facto, the court
must analyze whether the statute has been applied retroactively, and whether the application
works a disadvantage to the offender. Id. at 945. The court stated that "not only was the
sanction for the unlawful activity increased to permit the imposition of a fine and restitution
where they were not permissible at the time appellant committed the act, but the conditions of
release on parole were modified to make payment of court ordered monetary reimbursement or
assessments a condition of release. This is the type of legal disadvantage which was disapproved
in Weaver" Id. at946.
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Likewise, in the case at hand, when Stllings was sentenced, the Board of Pardons and
Parole did not have even the ostensible authority to order parolees to pay restitution. Clearly
such an order, imposed as a condition of parole, substantially increases the punishment imposed
by the sentencing court. Therefore, the Court finds that this statute, which purports to authorize
the Board to order restitution, is substantive in making the punishment for the crime more
burdensome, and is violative of Utah Code §68-3-3, as well as the ban on ex post facto laws
established by the Utah constitution and the United States Constitution.
The petitioner's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
DATED this

/ ^ liav of October, 1995.

LESLIE A. LEWII
DISTRICT COUR'

OOOI<H
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Court Order, to
the following, this ffi "day of October, 1995:

M. David Eckersley
PRINCE YEATES & GELDZAHLER
Attorney for Petitioner
City Centre I, Suite 900
175 East 400 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Martha S. Stonebrook
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
330 South 300 East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ADDENDUM "B"

Utah Const, art. I, section 18
Art. I, § 18

CONSTITUTION OF UTAH
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

Am. JUT. 2d. — 25 Am. Jur. 2d Elections
§§ 4 to 7.

C.J.S. — 29 CJ.S. Elections § 6.
Key Numbers. — Elections «=> 7.

Sec. 18. [Attainder — Ex post facto laws — Impairing contracts.]
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
contracts shall be passed.
History: Const 1896.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Bill of attainder.
Criminal punishment.
Ex post facto laws.
Impairment of contracts.
Ex post facto.
Bill of attainder.
A bill of attainder is one that imposes guilt,
and inflicts punishment, upon an identifiable
individual or group without judicial process;
county ordinance prohibiting massages by
members of the opposite sex, with certain exceptions, was not a bill of attainder where no
identifiable individual or group was, by operation of the ordinance alone, the subject of legislative punishment without due process. Redwood Gym v. Salt Lake County Comm'n, 624
P.2d 1138 (Utah 1981).
Criminal punishment.
An amendment of a criminal statute which
lessens punishment controls the sentence pronounced after the effective date of the amendment, even where pronouncement was delayed
by defendant's unlawful failure to appear for
sentencing. Belt v. Turner, 25 Utah 2d 380,
483 P.2d 425 (1971).
Ex post facto laws.
Law requiring state officers to give bond
within certain time after beginning of term,
which was enacted subsequent to beginning of
term of officer, was not retroactive divesting
vested rights, impairing obligation of contract
or imposing new obligations. State ex rel. Stain
v. Christensen, 84 Utah 185, 35 P.2d 775
(1934).
Neither the federal nor state Constitution
has any provision in terms prohibiting retroactive legislation — excepting that which forbids
the enactment of ex post facto laws. Garrett
Freight Lines v. State Tax Comm'n, 103 Utah
390, 135 P.2d 523, 146 A.L.R. 1003 (1943).

Impairment of contracts.
Change or limitation of remedy, which does
not materially abndge right, does not impair
obligation of contract. Kirkman v. Bird, 22
Utah 100, 61 P. 338, 58 L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St.
R. 774 (1900); Salter v. Nelson, 85 Utah 460,
39 P.2d 1061 (1935).
Former statute which exempted to married
men, or heads of families, their earnings from
personal services rendered within 60 days next
preceding levy of execution, by garnishment or
otherwise, held not to have impaired obligation
of contracts entered into prior to its enactment.
Kirkman v. Bird, 22 Utah 100, 61 P. 338, 58
L.R.A. 669, 83 Am. St. R. 774 (1900).
Former law, increasing homestead exemption from $1000 to $1500, was not invalid as
impairing obligation of contracts. Folsom v.
Asper, 25 Utah 299, 71 P. 315 (1903).
The power to fix rates having been retained
by the state under the Public Utilities Act, the
action of the commission in fixing rates to be
charged by street railway company notwithstanding city ordinance granting street railway franchise to operate railway over streets,
did not in any manner result in impairment of
contract. Murray City v. Utah Light & Traction Co., 56 Utah 437, 191 P. 421 (1920).
Regulation of rates for public utilities is governmental function coming directly within police power of state, and for that reason the establishing or modifying of rates, although contractual, does not violate this provision. United
States Smelting, Ref. & Milling Co. v. Utah
Power & Light Co., 58 Utah 168, 197 P. 902
(1921).
Provision of Workmen's Compensation Act
which provides that, when any injury is caused
by wrongful act of third person, claimant must
elect whether to take compensation under act
or to pursue his remedy against third person is
valid as against contention that it impairs obligation of contract of employment. Leva v. Utah
Fuel Co., 58 Utah 388, 199 P. 659 (1921).
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Utah Const, art. VII, section 12 (1991)
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Art. VII, § 12

Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons — Respites and reprieves.]
Until otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Justices of the Supreme
Court and Attorney General shall constitute a Board of Pardons, a majority of
whom, including the Governor, upon such conditions as may be established by
the Legislature, may remit fines and forfeitures, commute punishments, and
grant pardons after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to such regulations as may be provided by law, relative to the
manner of applying for pardons; but no fine or forfeiture shall be remitted,
and no commutation or pardon granted, except after a full hearing before the
Board, in open session, after previous notice of the time and place of such
hearing has been given. The proceedings and decisions of the Board, with the
reasons therefor in each case, together with the dissent of any member who
may disagree, shall be reduced to writing, and filed with all papers used upon
the hearing, in the office of such officer as provided by law.
The Governor shall have power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of
convictions for offenses against the State, except treason or conviction on
impeachment; but such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond the next
session of the Board of Pardons; and such Board, at such session, shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or they may commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In case of conviction for
treason, the Governor shall have the power to suspend execution of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the Legislature at its next regular
session, when the Legislature shall either pardon, or commute the sentence,
or direct its execution; and the Governor shall communicate to the Legislature
at each regular session, each case of remission of fine or forfeiture, reprieve,
commutation or pardon granted since the last previous report, stating the
name of the convict, the crime for which convicted, the sentence and its date,
the date of remission, commutation, pardon or reprieve, with the reasons for
granting the same, and the objections, if any, of any member of the Board
made thereto.
History: Const. 1896; L. 1979, S.J.R. 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Composition of board.
Condition for termination of sentence.
Exclusiveness of pardoning power.
Good time allowances.
Minimum mandatory sentence.
Power to commute punishments.
Suspension of sentence as exercise of pardoning power.
Composition of board.
Legislature is given power and authority to
change the personnel of the board of pardons.
Cardisco v. Davis, 91 Utah 323, 64 P.2d 216
(1937).
The phrase "until otherwise provided by
law" in this section means until otherwise provided by Legislature and does not mean until
changed by constitutional amendment so that

statute providing for make-up of board of pardons was valid and board had legal status.
Adriano v. Turner, 20 Utah 2d 350, 437 P.2d
891 (1968).
Condition for termination of sentence.
Condition for termination of sentence imposed by board of pardons that prisoner agree
to leave state was not unconstitutional as
amounting to banishment. Mansell v. Turner,
14 Utah 2d 352, 384 P.2d 394 (1963).
Exclusiveness of pardoning power.
Under this section, only board of pardons has
right to commute punishments and grant pardons. State ex rel. Bishop v. State Bd. of Cors.,
16 Utah 478, 52 P. 1090 (1898).
Statute, giving power of parole to board of
corrections, held invalid as in conflict with this
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Utah Const, art. VII, section 12 (Supp. 1995)
29

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

Art. VII, § 14

Sec. 12. [Board of Pardons and Parole —Appointment —
Powers and procedures — Governor's powers
and duties — Legislature's powers.]
(1) There is created a Board of Pardons and Parole. The Governor shall
appoint the members of the board with the consent of the Senate. The terms of
office shall be as provided by statute.
(2) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole, by majority vote and upon other
conditions as provided by statute, may grant parole, remit fines, forfeitures and restitution orders, commute punishments, and grant pardons
after convictions, in all cases except treason and impeachments, subject to
regulations as provided by statute.
(b) A fine, forfeiture, or restitution order may not be remitted and a
commutation, parole, or pardon may not be granted except after a full
hearing before the board, in open session, and after previous notice of the
time and place of the hearing has been given.
(c) The proceedings and decisions of the board, the reasons therefor in
each case, and the dissent of any member who may disagree shall be
recorded and filed as provided by statute with all papers used upon the
hearing.
(3) (a) The Governor may grant respites or reprieves in all cases of
convictions for offenses against the state except treason or conviction on
impeachment. These respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next
session of the board. At that session, the board shall continue or determine
the respite or reprieve, commute the punishment, or pardon the offense as
provided in this section.
(b) In case of conviction for treason, the Governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to the Legislature at its next
annual general session, when the Legislature shall pardon or commute the
sentence, or direct its execution. If the Legislature takes no action on the
case before adjournment of that session, the sentence shall be executed.
History: Const 1896; L. 1979, S.JJL 7; approved by the electors on November 3,1992,
1992, SJUL 8, { 6.
and took effect on January 1,1993. The amendAmendment Notes. — The 1992 amend- ment rewrote the section,
ment was proposed by Laws 1992, S. J.R. 8, § 6,

Sec. 13.

[Repealed.]

Repeals. — Laws 1992, S.J.R. 8, § 11 proposed repealing this section, which read "Until
otherwise provided by law, the Governor, Attorney General, and State Auditor shall constitute
a Board of Examiners, with power to examine
all such ciaims against the State as-provided by
law, and perform such other duties as provided

by law; and no such claim against the State
shall be passed upon by the Legislature without having been considered and acted upon by
the Board of Examiners." The repeal was approved by the electors of the state to take effect
on January 1,1993.

Sec. 14. [Duties of Lieutenant Governor.]
The Lieutenant Governor shall:
(1) serve on all boards and commissions in lieu of the Governor
whenever so designated by the Governor;
(2) perform such duties as may be delegated by the Governor; and
(3) perform other duties as may be provided by statute.
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Revocation of parole — Procedure.
Discharge from parole — Application of parole time to sentence.
County attorney to furnish information.
Peace officer status of adult probation and parole section agents.
Violating terms of probation.
Clinics and examinations.
Criminal identification bureau records.
Adult probation and parole section created — Parole and probation districts —
Employees in classified service.
Out-of-state supervision of probationers and parolees — Authority to enter into
compacts.
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Short title.

77-27-1. Definitions. As used in this chapter:
(1) "Pardon" is an act of grace by an appropriate authority exempting
a person from punishment for a crime;
(2) "Parole" is a release from imprisonment on prescribed conditions
which, if satisfactorily performed by the parolee, entitles him to a termination of his sentence;
(3) "Commutation" is the change from a greater to a lesser punishment
after conviction;
(4) "Termination" is the act of an appropriate authority discharging
from parole or concluding the sentence of imprisonment prior to the expiration of the sentence;
(5) "Reprieve or respite" is the temporary suspension of the execution
of the sentence;
(6) "Expiration" occurs when the maximum sentence has run; and
(7) "Probation" is an act of grace by the court suspending the imposition or execution of a convicted offender's sentence upon prescribed conditions.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-1, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

Cross-References.
Board of pardons, governor's power to
grant respites and reprieves, Const. Art. VII,
§12.
Termination or discharge of parolee from
sentence, 76-3-202.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Amnesty distinguished.
A pardon was to be distinguished from
amnesty in that the former relieved an
offender from the consequences of an offense

of which he had been convicted, while
amnesty obliterated an offense before conviction. United States v. Bassett (1887) 5 U 131,
* 3 P 237, reversed on another point 137 US
496, 34 L Ed 762,11 S Ct 165.
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77-27-2. Board of pardons within department of social services —
Establishment — Membership — Three-member panels — Qualifications and appointment — Terms — Vacancies — Removal. There is
established within the department of social services a board of pardons,
which shall consist of five part-time members, all of whom shall be resident citizens of the State of Utah, and who shall be appointed by the board
of corrections. The board may sit as a panel of three members, the chairman or, in the absence of the chairman, the vice chairman, and two rotating members constituting such a panel. Such panel, by majority decision,
may act for the entire board to determine whether parole, pardon, commutation, termination of sentence, or remission of fines and forfeitures shall
be granted in individual cases, but a majority decision by the entire board
shall be required for adoption of rules, regulations or policies of general
applicability pursuant to section 77-27-7. The present members of the state
board of pardons are to continue to serve and shall become the members
of the board of pardons until the terms for which they were appointed
shall expire and until their respective successors shall be appointed and
qualified. Thereafter, each member of the board of pardons shall hold office
for four years and until his successor shall be appointed and qualified. No
member shall serve more than two consecutive terms. Any vacancy occurring in the membership of the board of pardons otherwise than by expiration of the term, shall be filled in the same manner as those occurring by
expiration of term, but for the unexpired term only. Any member of the
board of pardons may be removed from office prior to expiration of the
member's term by the board of corrections for cause, after proper notice
and hearing.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-2, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
Crass-References.
Creation of department of social services
and boards and divisions within department,
63-35-3.

Collateral References.
Pardon |md Paroie ^
5> 1 4 . 1 4 < 2 2.
67A CJS Pardon and Parole §§6-8, 10,
39-60.
59 AmJur 2d 53-75, Pardon and Parole
§§ 77-102.

DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW
Constitutionality.
Constitutional provision that "until otherwise provided by law, the governor, justices
of the Supreme Court and attorney general
shall constitute a board of pardons" meant

until otherwise provided by legislature and
did not mean until changed by constitutional
amendment; statute providing for make-up of
board of pardons was valid. Adriano v.
Turner (1968) 20 U 2d 350, 437 P 2d 891.

77-27-3. Duties of board — Decisions final — Governor's power —
Restitution as condition. (1) The board of pardons shall determine, by
majority decision, when and under what conditions, subject to the provisions of this chapter, persons now or hereafter serving sentences, in all
cases except treason or impeachments, or as otherwise limited by law, may
be released upon parole, pardoned, or have their fines or forfeitures
remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated. Nofineor forfeiture
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shall be remitted, no parole, pardon or commutation granted or sentence
terminated, except after a full hearing before the board in open session
and after appropriate prior notice to the defendant of the time and place
of the hearing has been given. The orders and decisions of the board of
pardons and any dissent thereto shall be reduced to writing.
(2) The determinations and decisions of the board of pardons in cases
involving approval or denial of any action whatsoever, of paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence, or remission of fines and forfeitures shall be final.
(3) Nothing herein shall be construed as a denial of or limitation on
the governor's power to grant respites or reprieves in all cases of convictions for offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on
impeachment; however, such respites or reprieves shall not extend beyond
the next session of the board of pardons and the board, at such session,
shall continue or determine such respite or reprieve, or it may commute
the punishment, or pardon the offense as herein provided. In the case of
conviction for treason, the governor has the power to suspend execution
of the sentence, until the case shall be reported to the legislature at its
next session, when the legislature shall either pardon or commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
In determining when and where and under what conditions persons now
or hereafter serving sentences may be released upon parole, pardoned or
have their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or
terminated, the state board of pardons shall consider whether such persons
have made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with the standards and procedures of section 76-3-201, as a condition
of any parole, pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, commutation or termination of sentence.
If the state board of pardons determines that restitution is inappropriate, the state board of pardons shall state in writing as a part of the record
of proceedings, the reasons for the decision.
(4) Whenever the state board of pardons orders the release on parole
of an inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to section 76-3-201, but with respect to whom payment of all or a portion of the
restitution was suspended until his release from imprisonment, the board
may establish a schedule by which payment of the restitution may be
resumed. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled inmate's performance thereunder the board may consider the factors specified in section 76-3-201 (3). The board may provide to the sentencing court a copy
of the schedule and any modifications thereof.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § % L. 1981, ch. 59, % Z.
., , -T A
n
CompJert Notes.
The 1981 amendment inserted "to the
defendant" in the second sentence of subsec

(1); and added the last two paragraphs of
subsec. (3).
Collateral References.
^ ^
par(Jon ^
paro,e ^ 5
67A CJS Pardon and Parole §§6-8, 10,
39-60.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

constitute a board of pardons* meant until
otherwise provided by legislature and did not
Constitutionality
changed by constitutional amendm e a n mt]i
Cited
ment, statute providing for make-up of board of
ri~~~+i^+i~~~\:+„
pardons was valid Adnano v Turner, 20 Utah
Constitutionality.
,. , «. f , f .
2d 350, 437 P 2d 891 (1968)
Constitutional provision that "until other'
**««*••• v**w/
wise provided by law, the governor, justices of
Cited in State v Bishop, 717 P2d 261 (Utah
the Supreme Court and attorney general shall 1986)
COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am Jur 2d Pardon and
Parole §§ 10, 12,17, 73 et seq
CJJ5. — 67A C J S Pardon and Parole §§ 6
to 8, 10, 39 to 60

Key Numbers. — Pardon and Parole *=» 65

77-27-3. Repealed.
Repeals. — Section 77-27-3 (L 1980, ch 15,
§ 2, 1981, ch 59, § 3, 1983, ch 88, § 36),

relating to duties of the board, hearings, etc,
was repealed by Laws 1985, ch 213, § 10

77-27-4. Chairperson and vice chairperson.
(1) The governor shall select one of the members of the board to serve as
chairperson and board administrator at the governor's pleasure The chairperson may exercise the duties and powers, in addition to those estabhshed by this
chapter, necessary for the administration of daily operations of the board,
including personnel, budgetary matters, panel appointments, and scheduling
of hearings.
(2) The chairperson shall appoint a vice chairperson to act in the absence of
the chairperson.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-4, enacted by L.
1985, ch 198, § 8; 1989, ch. 112, § 1; 1990,
ch. 195, § 3.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws

1985, ch 198, § 8 repealed former § 77-27-4
(L 1980, ch 15, § 2,1983, ch 53, § 2), relating
to chairman and vice chairman and quorum of
board, and enacted present § 77-27-4

77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released
upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures,
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated
(b) The board may sit together or m panels to conduct hearings The
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and m
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings
involving commutation and pardons The chair may participate on any
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panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may
designate the chair for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the board or the board's appointed
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing
before the board.
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction,
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by
the board under that section This information shall be provided in terms
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases involving paroles,
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission
of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing
in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment.
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided In the case of conviction for treason, the
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or
commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated,
the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider whether the persons have
made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole,
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of
sentence.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1986, ch. 22, § 2; 1988, ch.
172, § 2; 1990, ch. 195, § 4; 1993, ch. 38,
§ 102; 1994, ch. 13, § 33.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1963, ch 53, § 3 repealed a former § 77-27-5
(L 1980, ch 15, § 2), relating to per diem and
expenses of board members, and enacted a new
§ 77-27-5
Laws 1985, ch. 213, § 1 repealed former
§ 77-27-5 (L 1983, ch 53, § 3), relating to

compensation and expenses of board and enacted the present section
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendment, effective May 3, 1993, inserted "or district" near the middle of Subsection (2)(a)
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" throughout the section and
substituted "chair" for "chairperson" throughout Subsection (lib)
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HUtory: C. 1963, 77-24-1, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 10, § 1; 1995, eh- 104,ft 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, added Subsection
(lXd) and made related changes.

77-24-1.5. Safekeeping by officer pending disposition —
Records required — Stray animals.
(1) Each peace officer shall:
(a) hold custodial property in safe custody:
(i) until it is received into evidence; or
(ii) if it is not used as evidence, until it can be disposed of as
provided in this chapter; and
(b) maintain a proper record of the custodial property that identifies:
(i) the owner of the custodial property, if known; and
(ii) the case for which it was taken or received and is being held.
(2) (a) Each municipal or county animal control officer shall hold any
unidentified or unclaimed stray dog or stray cat in safe and humane
custody for a minimum of three working days after the time of impound
prior to making any final disposition of the animal, including:
(i) placement in an adoptive home; or
(ii) euthanasia.
(b) An unidentified or unclaimed stray dog or stray cat may be
euthanized prior to the completion of the three working day minimum
holding period to prevent unnecessary suffering due to serious injury or
disease, if the euthanasia is in compliance with written established agency
or department policies and procedures, and with any local ordinances
allowing the destruction.
(c) An unidentified or unclaimed stray dog or stray cat shall be returned
to its owner upon proof of ownership and upon compliance with requirements of local animal control ordinances.
History: C. 1953, 77-24-1.5, enacted by L.
1992, ch. 10, § 2; 1995, ch. 104, § 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1995 amend-

ment, effective May 1, 1995, redesignated former Subsections (1) and (2) as Subsections
(l)(a) and (1Kb) and added Subsection (2).

CHAPTER 27
PARDONS AND PAROLES
Section
77-27-5.
77-27-6.
77-27-9.
77-27-21.5.

Board of Pardons and Parole
authority.
Payment of restitution.
Parole proceedings [Effective
April 29, 1996].
Sex offender registration — In-

formation system — Law
forcement and courts to
port — Registration
Penalty — Temporary
leases
—
Effect
expungement.
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77-27-5. Board of Pardons and Parole authority.
(1) (a) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine by majority
decision when and under what conditions, subject to this chapter and
other laws of the state, persons committed to serve sentences in class A
misdemeanor cases at penal or correctional facilities which are under the
jurisdiction of the Department of Corrections, and all felony cases except
treason or impeachment or as otherwise limited by law, may be released
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upon parole, pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their fines, forfeitures,
or restitution remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated.
(b) The board may sit together or in panels to conduct hearings. The
chair shall appoint members to the panels in any combination and in
accordance with rules promulgated by the board, except in hearings
involving commutation and pardons. The chair may participate on any
panel and when doing so is chair of the panel. The chair of the board may
designate the chair for any other panel.
(c) No restitution may be ordered, no fine, forfeiture, or restitution
remitted, no parole, pardon, or commutation granted or sentence terminated, except after a full hearing before the board or the boards appointed
examiner in open session. Any action taken under this subsection other
than by a majority of the board shall be affirmed by a majority of the board.
(d) A commutation or pardon may be granted only after a full hearing
before the board.
(e) The board shall determine restitution in an amount that does not
exceed complete restitution if determined by the court in accordance with
Section 76-3-201.
(2) (a) In the case of original parole grant hearings, rehearings, and parole
revocation hearings, timely prior notice of the time and place of the
hearing shall be given to the defendant, the county or district attorney's
office responsible for prosecution of the case, the sentencing court, law
enforcement officials responsible for the defendant's arrest and conviction,
and whenever possible, the victim or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5, and any related rules made by
the board under that section. This information shall be provided in terms
that are reasonable for the lay person to understand.
(3) Decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole in cases involving paroles,
pardons, commutations or terminations of sentence, restitution, or remission
of fines or forfeitures are final and are not subject to judicial review. Nothing
in this section prevents the obtaining or enforcement of a civil judgment,
including restitution as provided in Section 77-27-6.
(4) This chapter may not be construed as a denial of or limitation of the
governor's power to grant respite or reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or conviction on impeachment.
However, respites or reprieves may not extend beyond the next session of the
Board of Pardons and Parole and the board, at that session, shall continue or
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may commute the punishment, or
pardon the offense as provided. In the case of conviction for treason, the
governor may suspend execution of the sentence until the case is reported to
the Legislature at its next session. The Legislature shall then either pardon or
commute the sentence, or direct its execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under what conditions offenders
serving sentences may be paroled, pardoned, have restitution ordered, or have
their fines or forfeitures remitted, or their sentences commuted or terminated,
the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider whether the persons have
made or are prepared to make restitution as ascertained in accordance with
the standards and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a condition of any parole,
pardon, remission of fines or forfeitures, or commutation or termination of
sentence.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-5, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 213, § 1; 1986, ch. 22,5 2; 1988, ch.

172, § 2; 1990, ch. 195, § 4; 1993, ch. 38,
§ 102; 1994, ch. 13, ft 33; 1995, ch. 301, S 4.
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
Retroactive application.
,
—C^natitutionality.
For the Board of Pardons to apply the substantive standards in Subsections (6) and (7) of
this section in deciding whether to grant a
petition for a commutation hearing would di-

minish the opportunity for commutation that
was available at the time the crime was committed, in violation of Utah Const, Art. I, Sec.
l g prohibiting ex post facto laws. Andrews v.
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 836 R2d 790 (Utah 1992).

77-27-6. Payment of restitution.
(1) When the Board of Pardons and Parole orders the release on parole of an
inmate who has been sentenced to make restitution pursuant to Section
76-3-201 or whom the board has ordered to make restitution, and aD or a
portion of restitution is still owing, the board may establish a schedule by
which payment of the restitution shall be made, or order community service in
lieu of or in combination with restitution. In fixing the schedule and supervising the paroled offender's performance, the board may consider the factors
specified in Subsection 76-3-201(3).
(2) The board may impose any court order for restitution and order that a
defendant make restitution in an amount not to exceed the pecuniary damages
to the victim or victims of the offense of which the defendant has been
convicted, or the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted to by the
defendant to the sentencing court, unless the board applying the criteria as set
forth in Subsection 76-3-201(3)(b) determines that restitution is inappropriate.
(3) The board may also make orders of restitution for recovery of any or all
costs incurred by the Department of Corrections or the state or any other
agency arising out of the defendant's needs or conduct.
(4) If parole is terminated or the sentence expires while restitution is still
owed, the Board of Pardons and Parole shall forward a restitution order to the
sentencing court to be entered on the judgment docket. The entry shall
constitute a lien and is subject to the same rules as a judgment for money in
a civil judgment.
History: C. 1953, 77-27-6, enacted by L.
1985, ch. 213, § 2; 1986, ch. 22, § 3; 1993, ch.
124, § 1; 1994, ch. 13, § 35.
Repeals and Reenactments. — Laws
1985, ch 213, § 2 repealed former § 77-27-6
(L 1980, ch. 15, § 2), relating to meetings of
the board, and enacted present § 77-27-6.
Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amend-

ment, effective May 3, 1993, added subsection
designations and Subsection (4).
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsections (1) and (4)
Cross-References. — Judgments, U R C.P.
54 et seq

77-27-7. Parole or hearing dates — Interview — Hearings
— Report of alienists — Mental competency.
(1) The Board of Pardons and Parole shall determine within six months
after the date of an offender's commitment to the custody of the Department of
Corrections, for serving a sentence upon conviction of a felony or class A
misdemeanor offense, a date upon which the offender shall be afforded a
hearing to establish a date of release or a date for a rehearing, and shall
promptly notify the offender of the date.
(2) Before reaching a final decision to release any offender under this
chapter, the chair shall cause the offender to appear before the board, its panel,
723

